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ABSTRACT 
 
ALIXANDRA B. YANUS: Litigator Involvement and Success in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
and Supreme Court 
(Under the direction of Kevin T. McGuire) 
 
 
Literature on test case litigation has led researchers to expect that familiarity with 
case facts may increase a lawyer’s likelihood of victory before the U.S. Supreme Court.  
However, this question has not been examined empirically.  Here, I consider this question.  I 
use data on all federal cases orally argued before the Court during its 2000-2004 terms.  I 
find that interest group lawyers are the only kind of attorneys that are significantly more 
likely to become involved in the courts of appeals.  Early involvement, however, does not 
affect the probability that a party will win before the Supreme Court. 
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 LITIGATOR INVOVLEMENT AND SUCCESS IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
AND SUPREME COURT
 
 How important is planned litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court?  More than fifty 
years of literature on test case litigation has led scholars to expect that identifying cases early 
in the judicial process and shepherding them through the federal courts can lead to landmark 
legal change.  Scholars of interest group litigation such as Vose (1957, 1959, 1972, see also 
Cowan 1976, Sorauf 1976, O’Connor 1980, Friendly 1982, Greenberg 1994) have long 
pointed to the importance of foresight for interest group litigators fashioning planned 
litigation strategies. Lawyers such as the NAACP LDF’s Thurgood Marshall have identified 
cases early in the litigation process and expended tremendous effort and resources shepherd 
them through the judicial system in order to achieve social and legal change. 
 The expectation that having a lawyer who is familiar with the case at hand will 
increase a party’s probability of victory before the Supreme Court has not, however, been 
empirically tested.  This paper attempts to do just that, by tracking the involvement of the 
lawyers who argued more than 300 Supreme Court cases from 2000-2004.  I first consider 
when lawyers become involved in litigation, and then turn my attention to the question of 
how early involvement affects the probability that a party will win before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
I find that governmental lawyers—especially those working in the Solicitor General’s 
office—that argue before the Supreme Court are significantly less likely than other lawyers 
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to become involved in lower courts.  The same is true of lawyers based in Washington, D.C.  
On the other hand, interest group lawyers who argue before the Supreme Court are more 
likely than their counterparts to appear on briefs in the courts of appeals.  These findings hold 
true regardless of case type and whether the attorney is arguing for the petitioner or the 
respondent.  Being involved in the courts of appeals, however, does not appear to have a 
significant impact on the probability that a lawyer will win their case before the Supreme 
Court.   This finding has major consequences for the understanding of strategic litigation 
campaigns. 
Test Case Litigation in Practice 
Test case litigation is not a new phenomenon.  The earliest illustrations of this sort of 
strategic work date from the nineteenth century.  In July of 1890, for example, an interest 
group called the American Citizens’ Equal Rights Association (ACERA) designed a plan to 
challenge a Louisiana statute that mandated segregated railroad cars. (Woodward 1987). 
 On the very day that the bill was signed into law, two members of ACERA, Louis A. 
Martinet and Rudolphe L. Desdunes, published editorials in the New Orleans Crusader, a 
weekly newspaper devoted to the cause of equal rights for African Americans, urging a legal 
challenge to the statute.  Wrote Martinet, “The next thing is… to begin to gather funds to test 
the constitutionality of this law.  We’ll make a case, a test case, and bring it before the 
Federal Courts” (Martinet 1890 as quoted by Woodward 1987: 161).  
 Soon after, an ad hoc interest group, the Citizens’ Committee to Test the 
Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law, was created.  The group quickly hired a lawyer, 
who began to orchestrate a strategic challenge to the Louisiana statute.  A black passenger 
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would attempt to ride in a “white car,” and one of the white passengers would challenge their 
presence (Woodward 1987). 
 The first individual to attempt to carry out this plan was Desdunes’ son, Daniel.  
Although Daniel was arrested, the state supreme court eventually dismissed his case on a 
technicality.  The Citizens’ Committee decided to test the law again.  One week later, a one-
eighth black man with blond hair and blue eyes named Homer Plessy carried out the plan.  
He, too, was arrested.  Plessy’s case was heard first in municipal court, where a judge upheld 
his conviction and ruled the law constitutional.  The state supreme court also upheld the law.  
When a petition for rehearing was denied, the Citizens’ Committee appealed the case to the 
United States Supreme Court, which accepted the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in October of 
1895 (Woodward 1987). 
 Although the Citizens’ Committee effectively lost its challenge when the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute, Plessy represents one of the earliest 
examples of planned test case litigation (Woodward 1987). 1  With the support of interest 
groups such as ACERA and the Citizens’ Committee, Martinet and Desdunes were able to 
move the case through the appellate process to the United States Supreme Court.   In time, 
Plessy became a template for other disadvantaged groups and individuals seeking to use the 
courts to achieve social change.  
The NAACP LDF was one of the first groups to develop such a strategy.  First in 
housing discrimination and later in educational discrimination, the group carefully chose 
plaintiffs and venues in order to achieve incremental policy change in the civil rights arena 
(Vose 1959).  The groups’ most significant victory came in the educational equity case of 
                                                
1Other early examples include the women’s rights cases of Bradwell v. Illinois (1873) and Minor v. Happersett 
(1875). 
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Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  In this case, the Supreme Court effectively overturned 
the separate-but-equal standard established in Plessy.  The NAACP LDF attorney who 
guided Brown and its predecessors through the court, Thurgood Marshall, was later 
appointed as the first African American to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Women’s rights groups also used planned litigation to achieve their goals.  The 
American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project, led by future Supreme Court 
justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was often at the forefront of this work.  The Women’s Rights 
Project litigated a number of cases under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
clause and brought about significant legal change.  Examples of their work include cases 
such as Reed v. Reed (1971), which dealt with sex discrimination in will administration, and 
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), in which the Court found that military benefits must be 
distributed equally, regardless of gender  (O’Connor 1980). 
 More recently, gay rights groups have employed this strategy in their efforts to 
legalize same-sex marriage (O’Connor and Yanus 2007a).  Though their work has largely 
been in state supreme courts, organized interests such as Gay and Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders, the American Civil Liberties Union’s Gay and Lesbian Rights Project, Lambda 
Legal, and Freedom to Marry have designed legal strategies designed to persuade judges that 
the right to marry should be extended to same-sex couples.  The most notable victory of this 
movement came in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health (2003). 
Notably, an experienced and well-respected litigator, Evan Wolfson, has often 
masterminded the efforts of these groups.  Wolfson, formerly of Lambda Legal, is the 
founder and chief counsel of the recently created Freedom to Marry.  Some commentators 
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have compared Wolfson to Marshall and Ginsburg, noting that he has the vision and ability 
to see the big picture that many other competent lawyers within the gay rights movement 
lack (Mauro 2004b). 
Existing Research    
The seemingly overwhelming evidence of the significance of legendary litigators, 
especially in the civil and women’s rights movements, was important in laying the 
groundwork for understanding the crucial role played by lawyers in the legal process.  In the 
American context, this research is most extensive at the Supreme Court level.  Much of this 
owes to the work of McGuire (1993a, 1993b, 1995), who undertook an exploration of all of 
the lawyers who argued before the Supreme Court from 1977-1982.  He then identified an 
elite subset of lawyers who had argued more than three cases before the Court during this 
time period.   
McGuire found that lawyers played an essential role at every stage in Supreme Court 
practice.  They wrote briefs for certiorari and on the merits, composed amicus curiae briefs 
for interest groups, and often helped less experienced practitioners shape their case for the 
Court by offering advice on briefs or serving as members of moot courts (McGuire 1993b).  
They were also adept at identifying cases that were likely to be reviewed by the Court.  
Further, when elite attorneys presented oral arguments, the parties they represented were 
more likely to emerge victorious.2 
Other scholars have more completely explored the role of lawyers in presenting oral 
arguments before the Court.  In a study using Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s ratings of lawyers 
appearing before the Court in oral arguments, for example, Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs 
                                                
2The value of lawyer experience is not as clear in the comparative context.  In Canada, for example, Flemming 
and Krutz (2002) found that lawyer experience actually had a negative impact on a party’s likelihood of victory 
before the nation’s high court. 
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(2006) found that the quality of the lawyer’s oral argument affected the party’s likelihood of 
victory before the Court.3  Consistent with expectations, lawyers who received higher ratings 
were more likely to win than their lower rated counterparts. Not surprisingly, representatives 
of the federal government, former Supreme Court law clerks, elite law school graduates, or 
lawyers employed by Washington, D.C. firms generally received these higher ratings.  The 
characteristics of these litigators were strikingly similar to those of the elite lawyers observed 
by McGuire (1993b).  
Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley (1999) have also examined the effects of lawyer 
expertise using data from the courts of appeals.  Their analysis focused on products liability 
cases and supported previous scholarship.  The authors found that expertise was one of the 
most important advantages that a lawyer could bring to the courtroom.  Lawyers that had 
either a legal specialization in products liability or had appeared previously before that court 
of appeals were more likely than their counterparts to win in the final decision. 
 Studies such as these have quantified lawyers’ experience as the number of previous 
cases an attorney has argued before a court.  But, literature from the test case litigation 
tradition leads us to believe that familiarity with a preceding, measured as how long a lawyer 
has worked with that particular case, should also breed success.  This question, however, has 
not received empirical attention. 
 A systematic analysis of this question will shed light on how strategic litigants should 
act within the federal court system.  If, as the test case litigation literature suggests, early 
involvement breeds familiarity and leads to more favorable outcomes before the Supreme 
Court, strategic litigants should seek to identify lawyers and involve them in litigation as 
                                                
3Justice Blackmun evaluated each lawyer who argued before the Court.  These evaluations can be found in his 
notes on oral argument, which are stored in his papers in the Library of Congress.  Depending on the time 
period, ratings range from A-F, 1-100, or 1-10. 
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soon as possible.  Such a proposition is extraordinarily costly and would imply that the 
“haves” (Galanter 1974, Wheeler et al. 1987, Songer and Sheehan 1992) possess an even 
greater advantage in the American judicial system than originally expected.4 
 If, however, familiarity does not have an effect on case outcomes, a strategic litigant 
would be wise to use qualified, but perhaps less costly, attorneys until bringing their case 
before the Supreme Court.  This finding would bode at least somewhat better for traditionally 
disadvantaged parties.  It would also call into question the advisability of traditional test case 
litigation strategies.  
 It is worth noting that scholars are not universally convinced that interest groups 
engage in carefully planned test case litigation.   Wasby (1984) for example, used elite 
interviews with representatives from the NAACP LDF to demonstrate that groups are not 
always able to perfectly plan and control litigation.  He notes that resource shortages, 
political circumstances, outside events, and popular demands may substantially alter the 
agenda of a group. 
Hypotheses 
 With respect to when lawyers get involved in litigation, I have a number of 
expectations.  First, I hypothesize that lawyers from the Solicitor General’s office will be 
unlikely to appear on lower court briefs.  This is a function of the structure of the U.S. Justice 
Department.  Typically, regional U.S. Attorneys handle lower court litigation, leaving the 
solicitor and his deputies to handle only a select number of politically or socially important 
cases when they reach the Supreme Court. 
                                                
4Evidence from other nations, most notably the Philippines, suggests that the “haves” are not advantaged in all 
judicial systems (Haynie 1994, 1995). 
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 Washington attorneys should also be less likely to appear on court of appeals briefs.  
Many of these attorneys specialize in preparing briefs and oral argument for Supreme Court 
litigation.  As such, they may not be admitted to the bar outside of Maryland, Virginia, and 
the District of Columbia. 
 In contrast, I expect that lawyers representing other governments should be more 
likely to appear on lower court briefs.  If a state or local government is appearing in any 
federal court, it is reasonable to expect that they would want to be represented by their most 
expert attorney in any court.   
Similarly, I expect that interest group attorneys should be more likely to appear on 
lower court briefs.  This expectation is grounded in the extensive literature on test case 
litigation, which demonstrates that a number of organized interests identify cases early in the 
litigation process and expend a tremendous amount of effort and resources shepherding them 
through the judicial system (Vose 1957, 1959, 1972, Cowan 1976, Sorauf 1976, O’Connor 
1980, Friendly 1982, Greenberg 1994). 
 With respect to the effects of familiarity on success before the Supreme Court, I 
expect that the petitioner will be more likely to win the case when they are represented by an 
attorney based in Washington, D.C. or a lawyer from the office of the Solicitor General.  
These expectations follow from previous research on success before the Court, which found 
that expert lawyers such as these enjoy a number of advantages before the Court that are not 
accorded to other litigators (Caplan 1987, Salokar 1992, McGuire 1993b).   
Similarly, I expect that when an interest group lawyer represents a party, they will be 
more likely to win before the Supreme Court.  This expectation follows from the test case 
litigation literature.  Analyses of the NAACP LDF and women’s rights groups such as the 
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American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project have demonstrated that lawyers 
representing these organized interests have attained elite status before the Court (Vose 1972, 
O’Connor 1980). 
 The test case litigation literature also leads me to believe that a lawyer’s familiarity 
with a case should lead to success.  I test the accuracy of this hypothesis by first examining 
what distinguishes Supreme Court lawyers who were involved in the courts of appeals from 
those who became involved in a case only after the court of appeals decision.  I then further 
explore the question of whether this early involvement increases a lawyer’s probability of 
victory before the Supreme Court. 
Data and Methods 
 To conduct this analysis of interest representation, I use data from all cases orally 
argued during the 2000-2004 terms of the U.S. Supreme Court.  For the purposes of 
information accessibility and because state court cases are apt to have different dynamics 
than their federal counterparts, I select only those cases that moved through the federal court 
system.  This yields a total of 314 individual case citations and 628 lawyer observations (one 
for the petitioner and one for the respondent in each case).  These cases were selected using 
the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database. 
 I conduct two separate analyses.  The first examines when lawyers get involved in 
litigation. This analysis looks at whether the lawyer who orally argued the case before the 
Supreme Court also appeared on the court of appeals brief.   
The second analysis explores at the effects of case familiarity.  It asks whether a 
lawyer that is involved in the court of appeals has a greater probability of victory before the 
Supreme Court. 
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Dependent Variables 
I treat the analysis of when lawyers get involved in litigation separately from the 
analysis of how involvement affects success.  The dependent variable in the analysis of 
lawyer involvement is a dichotomous variable that measures whether a lawyer who orally 
argued a case before the Supreme Court also represented that party in proceedings before the 
court of appeals.  This variable was coded 1 if a lawyer appeared on the circuit court brief 
and 0 otherwise. 
 In instances where more than one lawyer argued for the petitioner or respondent in a 
single case citation, a consolidated observation was created.  This observation measures 
whether any one of the lawyers arguing before the Supreme Court participated at the circuit 
court level.  For example, four lawyers argued for the respondents in the campaign finance 
case of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003).  Although only a few of these 
lawyers appeared on a brief in the court of appeals, the consolidated observation reads 1 for 
participation in that court. 
 The dependent variable in the analysis of lawyer success is taken from the U.S. 
Supreme Court Judicial Database.  I use the “win” variable, which is a dichotomous measure 
of whether the petitioner won the case before the Supreme Court.  It is coded 1 in the case of 
a petitioner victory and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
I employ a number of independent variables, each of which measures a lawyer’s 
professional characteristics and affiliations.  Information on each of these characteristics was 
obtained from Supreme Court briefs and records, as well as supplemental searches of the 
Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers.   
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First, I examine whether a lawyer was affiliated with the Office of the Solicitor 
General. I expect that lawyers from the Solicitor General’s office are less likely to get 
involved in litigation in the courts of appeals than other attorneys.  Additionally, a number of 
studies have shown that the Solicitor General is the ultimate repeat player before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and as such, he enjoys advantaged status before the Court.  One of the 
attendant benefits of this advantage before the Court is that the Solicitor and his deputies are 
more likely to win than any other type of litigant (Caplan 1987, Salokar 1992, McGuire 
1998). 
Similarly, there exists a class of private attorneys who are more likely than their 
counterparts to win cases before the Supreme Court.  Research by McGuire (1993b) has 
shown that many of the members of this elite Supreme Court bar are based in Washington, 
D.C.  Thus, I consider whether the lawyer practiced in the nation’s capital.5  The inclusion of 
this variable is consistent with usage in other studies of lawyer expertise (Johnson, 
Wahlbeck, and Spriggs 2006). 
I also consider whether the lawyer represented an interest group.  As previously 
discussed, lawyers representing organized interests such as the NAACP LDF and women’s 
rights groups, for example, have attained elite status before the Court (Vose 1972, O’Connor 
1980).   Literature on test case litigation would also lead us to believe that having lawyers 
that shepherd cases through the judicial process may increase a party’s probability of victory 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Finally, I control for whether the lawyer was affiliated with another government (i.e. 
township, city, county, state).  I expect that these attorneys should be more likely to be 
                                                
5The Washington, D.C. lawyer variable excludes attorneys based in the Office of the Solicitor General even 
though these lawyers technically have offices in Washington, D.C. 
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involved in litigation in the courts of appeals.  Previous research has also shown that these 
attorneys are uniquely disadvantaged before the Supreme Court, and may actually be less 
likely to win than their counterparts (O’Connor and Epstein 1987). 
The coding for these variables was straightforward in the analysis of lawyer 
involvement.  Each lawyer was given a 1 if they met the characteristic and 0 otherwise.  So, 
for example, if the petitioner’s lawyer was a Washington attorney who was not the Solicitor 
General, a representative of another government, or an interest group, they were coded 1, 0, 
0, 0. 
In the analysis of success, lawyers for the petitioner and respondent were combined 
into one observation, because the unit of analysis is the case and not the individual lawyer.  
Each characteristic was coded 1 if it was true only of the petitioner’s lawyer, -1 if it was true 
of only the respondent’s lawyer, and 0 if it was true of both or neither of the petitioner and 
respondent’s lawyers.  Therefore, if the Solicitor General (0, 1, 0, 0) opposed the petitioner’s 
lawyer from the previous illustration, the case was coded 1, -1, 0, 0.  
In addition to the variables noted above, the success analysis also includes a variable 
that measures whether the attorney who orally argued before the Supreme Court appeared on 
the brief in the court of appeals.  This is the key variable of interest in this analysis.  
Control Variables  
I also include several control variables.  First, in the involvement model, I include a 
control for whether the lawyer represented the petitioner (1) or the respondent (0).   This is a 
necessary control because it is possible that different representational dynamics may be 
present on each side of the case.  Parties who lose before the court of appeals (the petitioner), 
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for example, may be less likely to retain their lawyer in Supreme Court proceedings than 
their counterparts who have won before the lower court (the respondent). 
I also include several dichotomous variables that control for the type of case.  These 
variables are derived from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database’s “value” variable.   
Using the information contained in this variable, I separate the cases into criminal, civil 
rights and liberties, economic, and all other cases.6  I expect that there may be variation 
across case types because different types of cases are likely to attract different kinds of 
parties.  Previous research has demonstrated that these parties vary widely in the resources 
they devote to litigation (Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer 1992).  
In the success model, I use several different controls.  First, I consider the direction of 
the lower court’s decision.  This variable is taken from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial 
Database’s “lctdir” variable.  It is coded 0 if the lower court made a conservative decision 
and 1 if the lower court made a liberal decision.  This control is used following prior studies 
that have demonstrated that lower court decisions can affect lawyers’ success before the 
Court (McGuire 1995). 
I also control for case salience, since McGuire and McAtee (2007) have found that 
salience affects the impact that lawyers have on case outcomes.  I consider the model using 
both the New York Times measure developed by Epstein and Segal (2000) and an alternate 
measure developed by Congressional Quarterly.  These measures are taken from the 
Supreme Court Compendium (Segal et al. 2006). 
Findings 
                                                
6Criminal cases are those where value=1, civil rights and liberties cases are those where value=2, 3, 4, or 5, and 
economic cases are those where value=8. 
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 Before exploring whether early involvement affects a litigator’s success before the 
Supreme Court, it is necessary to consider the lawyers’ characteristics and when they become 
involved in cases within the federal court system.  I examine these questions in greater detail 
in the sections that follow. 
Preliminary Observations 
Of the 628 total observations from 2000 to 2004, 44 percent of lawyers who argued 
before the Supreme Court also appeared on a brief in the court of appeals.   This percentage 
is smaller than some observers might anticipate.  When coupled with additional findings 
about the identities of lawyers who argue before the Court, however, it may be suggestive of 
the increasing specialization of the Washington bar. 
Interest groups employed only 5 percent of lawyers arguing before the Court during 
this time period.  This suggests that interest groups may not be employing their own lawyers 
to do litigation work, perhaps choosing to work with private, pro bono attorneys who come at 
no additional cost (O’Connor and Yanus 2007b).   
Lawyers from the Solicitor General’s office comprised 22 percent of the population.  
This percentage is slightly larger than the 15 percent of lawyers from the Solicitor General’s 
office observed by Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs (2006), and may be reflective of the fact 
that my analysis captures only those cases that moved through the federal court system, and 
not all cases heard by the Supreme Court.  Presumably, cases coming from the federal court 
system are more likely to have the federal government as a party to litigation than their 
counterparts coming out of state judicial systems. 
The large proportion of lawyers that come from the Solicitor General’s office may 
also reinforce the idea that attorneys from the Solicitor General’s office may be advantaged 
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before the Court not only because they represent the federal government, but also because 
they are the ultimate repeat players (McGuire 1998).  Furthermore, if lawyers from the 
Solicitor General’s office appear before the Court in an increasingly greater proportion of 
cases, presumably their advantages before the Court may also increase. 
Lawyers who appeared on behalf of another government made up an additional 18 
percent of attorneys.  Thus, nearly half of all lawyers who appeared before the Supreme 
Court during this time period represented governments.  This finding is reflective of the 
Court’s docket composition, where an increasingly substantial percentage of cases involve 
governmental litigants.   
 Washington, D.C. lawyers were similarly well represented.  Even after eliminating 
those lawyers who work in Washington because they are employed by the Solicitor General’s 
office, 21 percent of lawyers who argued before the Supreme Court from 2000 to 2004 
worked in the capital city.  This number represents a significant increase in the percentage of 
Washington lawyers observed by Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs (2006).  In their study of 
lawyers appearing before the Court from 1970 to 1994, the authors found that 11 percent of 
the attorneys in their sample were lawyers based in Washington, D.C. 
 The growing percentage of the Supreme Court bar that is either a government lawyer 
or practicing in Washington, D.C. is most likely reflective of the growing specialization 
required by attorneys that argue before the Supreme Court.  One observer, for example, 
notes:  
If Supreme Court advocacy has always been the Matterhorn of the American legal 
profession, in recent years it has become the litigator's Mt. Everest, a challenge 
requiring the best sherpas money can buy. In part because more law firms want the 
prestige that comes with a Supreme Court practice, and in part because the shrinking 
of the court's docket--the justices hear half as many cases today as two decades ago--
has spurred competition for the business that remains, Supreme Court litigation has 
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become a highly specialized trade. Lawyers who want to go before the court must 
know everything from how to handle the lectern to what color the cover of their legal 
briefs must be (Mauro 2004a: 8). 
 
No longer can an attorney appear before the Court without hours of legal training and 
preparation.  And, while in the past, it was impossible to make a living solely off of Supreme 
Court practice, modern-day attorneys such as Thomas Goldstein have proved that it is 
possible today. 
 Appearing before the Supreme Court does not tell us the whole story about interest 
representation.  Understanding when these lawyers get involved in cases—and what the 
implications of that involvement might be—is far more important to the broader analysis of 
how familiarity with a case affects success before the Supreme Court. 
Involvement in the Court of Appeals 
The findings of the probit analysis shown in Table 1 are largely consistent with 
expectations.  As shown in Table 1, only three of the characteristics included in the model 
attain statistical and substantive significance.  Lawyers who are employed by the Solicitor 
General and lawyers who work in Washington, D.C. are significantly less likely than other 
lawyers to appear on a brief in the court of appeals.  This is what we would expect; after all, 
the Solicitor General and the Washington bar engage in very specialized practice and have 
significant advantages before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Their incentive to become involved 
in the lower courts, thus, should be very low. 
On the other hand, lawyers employed by interest groups are more likely than their 
peers to appear on briefs in the court of appeals.  This is consistent with the image of interest 
groups as the classic test-case litigators who attempt to identify cases early in the judicial 
process and stick with them throughout subsequent legal proceedings. 
17 
The effects of each of these variables are quite substantial. 7  Lawyers from the 
Solicitor General’s office, for example, are 47 percent less likely than their counterparts to 
appear on briefs in the court of appeals.  Lawyers employed by Washington firms are a 
similarly high 37 percent less likely than their counterparts to appear in the court of appeals. 
The effects for interest group lawyers are somewhat smaller, although still significant.  
Lawyers affiliated with interest groups are 25 percent more likely than other lawyers to 
appear on the briefs in the court of appeals. 
Interestingly, lawyers that work for other governments are not significantly different 
from other litigators in their participation.  This finding is somewhat unexpected.  Since state 
government lawyers are notoriously poor litigators, it would seem that states would be likely 
to deploy their best lawyer in any federal court in an effort to overcome this deficit.  This, 
however, does not appear to be the case.  One possible explanation for this turnover could be 
changes in state bureaucracies as a result of elections or new appointments.  Alternately, it 
may be that the disadvantages suffered by state attorneys general in the O’Connor and 
Epstein (1987) analysis are an artifact of another time. Further research is necessary to better 
understand the nature of this relationship. 
Finally, both control variables fail to exercise any significant effect on whether a 
lawyer who argued a case before the Supreme Court also appeared on a brief in the court of 
appeals.  It appears that the effects of lawyer characteristics are consistent regardless of case 
type or whether the lawyer represents the petitioner or respondent. 
Success Before the Supreme Court 
                                                
7The effects noted here are predicted probabilities calculated using Stata’s prchange command.  Because all of 
the variables are dichotomous variables, I note only the change from maximum value to minimum value. 
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 Knowing when lawyers get involved is certainly an important part of the story, but if 
some lawyers systematically engage earlier in the legal process, it is at least in part because 
they estimate that they will have a greater likelihood of success before the Supreme Court.  
In this section, I test whether this probability is actually higher by modeling lawyer success 
as a function of involvement in the courts of appeals. 
 Interestingly, few variables appear to have any significant effect on whether a lawyer 
wins before the Supreme Court.  Of the independent variables, only being represented by the 
Solicitor General appears to affect the petitioner’s likelihood of victory.  When the Solicitor 
represents the petitioner, the petitioner is approximately 15 percent more likely to win their 
case than under other conditions.8 
Whether the lawyer is a Washington attorney or the representative of an interest 
group has no effect.  The same holds true of the key independent variable, which measures 
whether a lawyer appeared on the court of appeals brief.  That is, early involvement in a case 
does not seem to increase a lawyer’s probability of victory before the Supreme Court.  These 
findings hold true regardless of case salience or the direction of the lower court’s decision.  
These findings suggest that anecdotal evidence from successful planned litigation 
campaigns such as the one that resulted in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) may have 
given observers a biased view of the impact of strategic litigation before the Supreme Court.  
They also lend some credence to Wasby’s (1984) findings that groups and litigants are not 
able to plan their litigation strategies as completely as they might like.   Wasby’s findings 
about the importance of public pressure on organized interests involvement in litigation may 
                                                
8The effects noted here are predicted probabilities calculated using Stata’s prchange command.  Because all of 
the variables are dichotomous variables, I note only the change from maximum value to minimum value. 
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even be more important in the modern world, where technology has made political news and 
interest group activity more accessible to the constituent public. 
These findings do not, however, suggest that representation is unimportant in the 
American legal system.  However, they may indicate that the emphasis many observers have 
placed on litigants’ efforts to develop a case for argument before the Supreme Court have 
been too extreme.  
Discussion  
  The results of the analysis of lawyer involvement confirm what scholars have long 
believed: lawyers get involved in litigation in systematic ways.  Many of these tactics are a 
function of legal specialization and institutional structures.  
 This specialization, perhaps, leads us to finds that familiarity with a case—measured 
as involvement with a case in the court of appeals—does not have a significant effect on the 
Supreme Court’s decision. This finding may implicitly validate earlier research about the 
importance of experience before a single court.  Lawyers such as those employed in the 
Solicitor General’s office and members of the Washington bar do not shepherd cases through 
the judicial process.  However, this decision does not appear to damage their likelihood of 
victory in this ultimate tribunal.  
 These findings have several important practical implications.  First, they suggest that 
while the “haves” are certainly advantaged in the legal process, this advantage may not be as 
significant as it could be.  Of course, the haves still have the wherewithal to hire the most 
experienced Supreme Court litigators, but there may not be as much of a carry-over effect 
from lower courts as might be expected. 
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 Second, these findings question some of the assumptions made by scholars of interest 
group litigation, who implicitly or explicitly seem to assume that identifying a case early in 
the process and shepherding it through trial and appellate courts is a way to achieve legal 
change.  The case studies of groups such as the NAACP LDF and the American Civil 
Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project, as well as the work of litigators such as 
Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, may be extraordinary examples that do not 
represent the norm of working before the Court.  The case facts and particular political 
circumstances which surrounded the cases these groups brought before the Court may be as 
important as their leadership in getting the cases there. 
Generally speaking, therefore, it may be more efficient and effective for parties to 
litigation to use serviceable representation throughout the legal process, and resort to hiring 
or attracting the best (and, perhaps, most experienced) representation only when the case 
faces the prospect of being heard by the Supreme Court.  This finding may be especially true 
for groups that have limited financial resources and must make decisions about when to 
begin retaining legal counsel. 
Conclusion 
This research demonstrates empirically that—regardless of the ideological leanings of 
a lower court’s decision or case salience—getting a lawyer involved earlier in the judicial 
process does not appear to have a significant effect on the outcome of a case.  This finding 
calls into question the exportability of theories about interest group litigation and suggests 
that strategic litigants may be wise to use skilled, but not necessarily elite attorneys when 
litigating before the courts of appeals.  Using limited resources toward elite representation 
can perhaps be reserved for the Supreme Court. 
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There is, however, much that cannot be said from the results of this analysis.  First, 
the effects of having a lawyer who is familiar with the case file a brief for certiorari are not 
examined in this analysis. Moreover, the differences in the characteristics of the lawyers that 
appear on the briefs filed with the Supreme Court and the actual lawyers that present oral 
arguments are not examined in this study.   
Second, I do not control for a lawyer’s expertise measured as the number of previous 
cases an attorney has argued before the Court; this factor may have a significant impact not 
only on when lawyers get involved in litigation, but on their likelihood of victory before the 
Court.  Furthermore, there may be important interactions between experience before the 
Court and familiarity with a case that are worth considering.  Notably, the interest group 
lawyers who are the foundation for many of the anecdotes about the importance of case 
familiarity were also very experienced litigators before the Supreme Court.  Both Thurgood 
Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued a number of cases before the Court before they 
were able to secure significant legal change.  
In addition, there may be other judicial and institutional characteristics that affect the 
importance of case familiarity.  Some justices, for example, may be more susceptible to the 
types of arguments made by attorneys who follow cases throughout the judicial process.  
Alternately, different classes of litigants may handle their legal proceedings 
differently, bringing attorneys into the process at different points in time.  Criminal 
defendants who file cases in forma pauperis, for example, are likely to have an experienced 
Washington attorney appointed to represent them before the Supreme Court; this attorney 
would not argue before lower courts.  Businesses, in contrast, may have the financial 
wherewithal to hire experienced attorneys throughout the judicial process.  
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Finally, the case’s circuit of origin could affect patterns of lawyering.  More 
prestigious circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit or the 9th Circuit may be likely to attract higher 
quality attorneys earlier in the judicial process than cases that are drawn from circuits that 
receive less national attention.  
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Table 1. Predictors of Participation in the Courts of Appeals 
 
 
 
Predictor Estimate Std. Error 
Solicitor General -1.525** .165 
Other Government -.159 .149 
D.C. Lawyer -1.112** .149 
Interest Group .647* .279 
Petitioner -.147 .113 
Criminal Case .263 .167 
Civil Rights/Liberties Case .244 .151 
Economic Case .189 .167 
Constant .252 .137 
l  -332.625  
Wald 
2 
154.38  
P .000  
R
2
M&Z 0.334  
     Notes: n=597. **p < .01, *p < .05 (two-tailed).  
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Table 2. Predictors of Litigator Success Before the Supreme Court 
 
Predictor Estimate Std. Error 
On Court of Appeals Brief .152 .131 
Solicitor General .493**   .158 
D.C. Lawyer .229    .154 
Interest Group -.153 .274 
Salience -.324 .219 
Lower Court Direction .008 .167 
Constant .532** .127 
l  -174.82  
Wald 
2 
13.43  
p 0.04  
R
2
M&Z .08  
     Notes: n=293. **p < .01, *p < .05 (two-tailed).  
                 Salience measure shown is New York Times; CQ measure is virtually the same. 
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